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Abstract
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) is a key technology
in many services and applications. This typically requires user
devices to send their speech data to the cloud for ASR decod-
ing. As the speech signal carries a lot of information about the
speaker, this raises serious privacy concerns. As a solution, an
encoder may reside on each user device which performs local
computations to anonymize the representation. In this paper,
we focus on the protection of speaker identity and study the
extent to which users can be recognized based on the encoded
representation of their speech as obtained by a deep encoder-
decoder architecture trained for ASR. Through speaker iden-
tification and verification experiments on the Librispeech cor-
pus with open and closed sets of speakers, we show that the
representations obtained from a standard architecture still carry
a lot of information about speaker identity. We then propose
to use adversarial training to learn representations that perform
well in ASR while hiding speaker identity. Our results demon-
strate that adversarial training dramatically reduces the closed-
set classification accuracy, but this does not translate into in-
creased open-set verification error hence into increased protec-
tion of the speaker identity in practice. We suggest several pos-
sible reasons behind this negative result.
Index Terms: speech recognition, end-to-end system, privacy,
adversarial training, speaker recognition
1. Introduction
With the emergence of pervasive voice assistants [1, 2] like
Amazon Alexa, Apple’s Siri and Google Home, voice has be-
come one of the most widespread forms of human-machine in-
teraction. In this context, the speech signal is sent from the
user device to a cloud-based service, where automatic speech
recognition (ASR) and natural language understanding are per-
formed in order to address the user request.1 While recent stud-
ies have identified security vulnerabilities in these devices [3,4],
such studies tend to hide more important privacy risks that can
have long-term impact. Indeed, state-of-the-art speech process-
ing algorithms can infer not only the spoken contents from
the speech signal, but also the speaker’s identity [5], inten-
tion [6–9], gender [10, 11], emotional state [12–14], pathologi-
cal condition [15–17], personality [18, 19] and cultural [20, 21]
attributes to a great extent. These algorithms require just a
few tens of hours of training data to achieve reasonable accu-
racy, which is easier than ever to collect via virtual assistants.
The dissemination of voice signals in large data centers thereby
poses severe privacy threats to the users in the long run.
These privacy issues have little been investigated so far. The
most prominent studies use homomorphic encryption and bit
1See e.g., https://cloud.google.com/speech-to-text/
string comparison [22,23]. While these methods provide strong
cryptographic guarantees, they come at a large computational
overhead and can hardly be applied to state-of-the-art end-to-
end deep neural network based systems.
An alternative software architecture is to pre-process voice
data on the device to remove some personal information before
sending it to web services. Although this does not rule out all
possible risks, a change of representation of the voice signal
can contribute to limiting unsolicited uses of data. In this pa-
per, we investigate how much of a user’s identity is encoded
in speech representations built for ASR. To this end, we con-
duct closed- and open-set speaker recognition experiments. The
closed-set experiment refers to a classification setting where all
test speakers are known at training time. In contrast, the open-
set experiment (a.k.a. speaker verification) aims to measure the
capability of an attacker to discriminate between speakers in a
more realistic setting where the test speakers are not known be-
forehand. We implement the attacker with the state-of-the-art
x-vector speaker recognition technique [24].
The representations of speech we consider in our work
are given by the encoder output of end-to-end deep encoder-
decoder architectures trained for ASR. Such architectures are
natural in our privacy-aware context, as they correspond to en-
coding speech on the user device and decoding in the cloud. Our
baseline network follows the ESPnet architecture [25], with one
encoder and two decoders: one based on connectionist temporal
classification (CTC) and the other on an attention mechanism.
Inspired by [26], we further propose to extend the network with
a speaker-adversarial branch so as to learn representations that
perform well in ASR while hiding the speaker identity.
Several papers have recently proposed to use adversarial
training for the goal of improving ASR performance by mak-
ing the learned representations invariant to various conditions.
While general form of acoustic variabilities have been stud-
ied [27], there is some work specifically on speaker invari-
ance [28, 29]. Interestingly, there is no general consensus on
whether it is more appropriate to use speaker classification
in an adversarial or a multi-task manner, despite the fact that
these two strategies implement opposite means (i.e., encourag-
ing representations to be speaker-invariant or speaker-specific).
This question was studied in [30], in which the authors con-
clude that both approaches only provide minor improvements in
terms of ASR performance. Their speaker classification experi-
ments also show that the baseline system already tends to learn
speaker-invariant features. However, they did not run speaker
verification experiments and hence did not assess the suitability
of these features for the goal of anonymization.
In contrast to these studies which aim to increase ASR
performance, our goal is to assess the potential benefit of ad-
versarial training for concealing speaker identity in the con-
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Figure 1: Architecture of the proposed model. The speaker-adversarial branch is shown as a red box. The red arrow indicates gradient
reversal. When the model is deployed, the encoder could reside at the client side, while the decoder can be hosted by cloud services.
text of privacy-friendly ASR. Our contributions are the follow-
ing. First, we combine CTC, attention and adversarial learning
within an end-to-end ASR framework. Second, we design a
rigorous protocol to quantify speaker identity in ASR represen-
tations through a series of closed-set classification and open-set
verification experiments. Third, we run these experiments on
the Librispeech corpus [31] and show that this framework dra-
matically reduces speaker classification accuracy, but does not
increase speaker verification error. We suggest several possible
reasons behind this disparity.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we describe the baseline ASR model and our proposed
adversarial model. Section 3 explains the experimental setup
and presents our results. Finally, we conclude and discuss fu-
ture work in Section 4.
2. Proposed model
We start by describing the ASR model we use as a baseline,
before introducing our speaker-adversarial network.
2.1. Baseline ASR model
We use the end-to-end ASR framework presented in [32] as the
baseline architecture. It is composed of three sub-networks: an
encoder which transforms the input sequence of speech feature
vectors into a new representation φ, and two decoders that pre-
dict the character sequence from φ. We assume that these net-
works have already been trained using data previously collected
by the service provider (which may be public data, opt-in user
data, etc). Then, in the deployment phase of the system that
we envision, the encoder would run on the user device and the
resulting representation φ would be sent to the cloud for decod-
ing.
The first decoder is based on CTC and the second on an
attention mechanism. As argued in [32], attention works well
in most cases because it does not assume conditional indepen-
dence between the output labels (unlike CTC). However, it is so
flexible that it allows nonsequential alignments which are un-
desirable in the case of ASR. Hence, CTC acts as a regularizer
to prune such misaligned hypotheses. We denote by θe the pa-
rameters of the encoder, and by θc and θa the parameters of the
CTC and attention decoders respectively. The model is trained
in an end-to-end fashion by minimizing an objective function
Lasr which is a combination of the losses Lc and La from both
decoder branches:
min
θe,θc,θa
Lasr(θe, θc, θa) = λLc(θe, θc) + (1− λ)La(θe, θa),
with λ ∈ [0, 1] a trade-off parameter between the two decoders.
We now formally describe the form of the two lossesLc and
La. We denote each sample in the dataset as Si = (Xi, Yi, zi),
where Xi = {x1, ..., xT } is the sequence of T acoustic fea-
ture frames, Yi = {y1, ..., yM} is the sequence of M char-
acters in the transcription, and zi is the speaker label. In the
case of CTC, several intermediate label sequences of length
T are created by repeating characters and inserting a spea-
cial blank label to mark character boundaries. Let Ψ(Yi) be
the set of all such intermediate label sequences. The CTC
loss Lc(θe, θc) is computed as Lc = − lnP (Yi|Xi; θe, θc)
where P (Yi|Xi; θe, θc) = ∑ψ∈Ψ(Yi) P (ψ|Xi; θe, θc). This
sum is computed by assuming conditional independence over
Xi, hence P (ψ|Xi; θe, θc) = ∏Tt=1 P (ψt|Xi; θe, θc) ≈∏T
t=1 P (ψt; θe, θc). The attention branch does not require
an intermediate label representation and conditional indepen-
dence is not assumed, hence the loss is simply computed as
La(θe, θa) = −∑m∈M lnP (ym|Xi, y1:m−1; θe, θa).
2.2. Speaker-adversarial model
In order to encourage the network to learn representations that
are not only good at ASR but also hide speaker identity, we
propose to extend the above architecture with what we call
a speaker-adversarial branch. This branch models an adver-
sary which attempts to infer the speaker identity from the en-
coded representation φ. We denote by θs the parameters of the
speaker-adversarial branch. Given the encoder parameters θe,
the goal of the adversary is to find θs that minimizes the loss
Lspk(θe, θs) = − lnP (zi|Xi; θe, θs). Our new model is then
trained in an end-to-end manner by optimizing the following
min-max objective:
min
θe,θc,θa
max
θs
Lasr(θe, θc, θa)− αLspk(θe, θs),
where α ≥ 0 is a trade-off parameter between the ASR ob-
jective and the speaker-adversarial objective. The baseline net-
work can be recovered by setting α = 0. Note that the max
part of the objective corresponds to the adversary, which con-
trols only the speaker-adversarial parameters θs. The goal of
the speaker-adversarial branch is to act as a “good adversary”
and produce useful gradients to remove the speaker identity in-
formation from the encoded representation φ. In practice, we
use a gradient reversal layer [33] between the encoder and the
speaker-adversarial branch so that the whole network can be
trained end-to-end via backpropagation. We refer to Fig. 1 for
an illustration of the full architecture.
3. Experimental evaluation
3.1. Datasets
We use the Librispeech corpus [31] for all the experiments. We
use different subsets for ASR training, adversarial training, and
speaker verification. For the sake of clarity we refer to them as
data-full, data-adv, and data-spkv, respectively (see Table 1).
The data-full set is almost the original Librispeech corpus, in-
cluding train-960 for training, dev-clean and dev-other for val-
idation, and test-clean and test-other for test, except that utter-
ances with more than 3,000 frames or more than 400 characters
have been removed from train-960 for faster training.
The data-adv set is a 100 h subset of train-960, which is
obtained by removing long utterances from the original Lib-
rispeech train-100 set similarly to above. It is split into three
subsets in order to perform closed-set speaker identification ex-
periments, since the speakers in the original train/dev/test splits
are disjoint. There are 251 speakers in data-adv: we assign 2 ut-
terances per speaker to each test-adv and dev-adv. The remain-
ing utterances are used for training and referred to as train-adv.
For speaker verification with x-vectors [24], we use data-
spkv, which is again derived from data-full. The train-960 sub-
set was augmented using room impulse responses, isotropic and
point-source noises [34] as well as music and speech [35] as per
the standard sre16 recipe for training x-vectors [24] from the
Kaldi toolkit [36], which we adapted to Librispeech. This in-
creased the amount of data by a factor of 4. A subset of the aug-
mented data containing 373,985 utterances was used to train the
x-vector representation and another subset containing 422,491
utterances to train the probabilistic linear discriminant analysis
(PLDA) backend. These subsets are referred to as train-spkv
and train-plda, respectively. For evaluation, we built an enroll-
ment set (test-clean-enroll) and a trial set (test-clean-trial) from
the test-clean data. Out of 40, 29 speakers were selected from
test-clean based on sufficient data availability. For each speaker,
we selected a 1 min subset after speech activity detection for en-
rollment and used the rest for trials. The details of the trials are
given in Table 2.
Table 1: Splits of Librispeech used in our experiments.
dataset data split # utts duration (h)
data-full
train-960 281,231 960.98
test-clean 2,620 5.40
dev-clean 2,703 5.39
test-other 2,939 5.34
dev-other 2,864 5.12
data-adv
train-adv 27,535 97.05
dev-adv 502 1.77
test-adv 502 1.77
data-spkv
train-spkv 373,985 1,388.79
train-plda 422,491 1,443.96
test-clean-enroll 438 0.75
test-clean-trial 1496 3.60
Table 2: Detailed description of the trial set (test-clean-trial)
for speaker verification experiments.
Male Female
# Speakers 13 16
# Genuine trials 449 548
# Impostor trials 9,457 11,196
3.2. Evaluation metrics
For all tested systems, we measure ASR performance in terms
of the word error rate (WER) and we assess the amount of infor-
mation about speaker identity in the encoded speech represen-
tation in terms of both speaker classification accuracy (ACC)
and speaker verification equal error rate (EER). The WER is
reported on the test-clean set. The ACC measures how well
speakers can be discriminated in a closed-set setting, i.e., speak-
ers are known at training time. It is evaluated over the test-
adv set using the same classifier architecture as the speaker-
adversarial branch of the proposed model (see Section 2). As
opposed to the ACC, the EER measures how well the represen-
tations hide the speaker identity for unknown speakers, in an
open-set scenario. It reflects the process of confirming whether
a person is actually who the attacker thinks it might be. It eval-
uated over the trial set (see Table 2) using x-vector-PLDA.
The ACC and the EER will be computed for different repre-
sentations: the baseline filterbank features, the representations
encoded by the network trained for ASR only (corresponding
to φ0) as well as those obtained with the speaker-adversarial
approach (corresponding to φα for some values of α > 0).
3.3. Network architecture and training
For all experiments, we use the ESPnet [25] toolkit which im-
plements the hybrid CTC/attention architecture [32]. The in-
put features are 80-dimensional mel-scale filterbank coefficients
with pitch and energy features, totalling 84 features per frame.
The encoder is composed of a VGG-like convolutional neural
network (CNN) layer followed by 5 bidirectional long short-
term memory (LSTM) layers with 1,024 units. The VGG layer
contains 4 convolutional layers followed by max pooling. The
feature maps used in the convolution layers are of dimensions
(1×64), (64×64), (64×128) and (128×128). The attention-
based decoder consists of location-aware attention [37] with 10
convolutional channels of size 100 each followed by 2 LSTM
layers with 1,024 units. The CTC loss is computed over sev-
eral possible label sequences using dynamic programming. In
all experiments, the trade-off parameter λ between the two de-
coder losses is set to 0.5. We train a single-layer recurrent neu-
ral network language model (RNNLM) with 1,024 hidden units
over the train-960 transcriptions and use it to rescore the ASR
hypotheses. The resulting WER is very close to the state of the
art [38] when trained on train-960. Finally, we implemented
the speaker-adversarial branch via a 3 bidirectional LSTM lay-
ers with 512 units followed by a softmax layer with 251 out-
puts corresponding to the 251 speakers in data-adv. The adver-
sarial loss Lspk is summed across all vectors in the sequence.
The speaker label zi is duplicated to match the length of the
sequence, which is smaller than T due to the subsampling per-
formed within the encoder. Due to this subsampling as well
as to the use of bidirectional LSTM layers within the encoder
and the speaker-adversarial branch, the frame-level adversarial
loss approximates well a utterance-level speaker loss that would
be computed from a fixed-sized utterance-level representation,
while being easier to train.
In all experiments, we start by pre-training the ASR branch
for 10 epochs over data-full and then the speaker-adversarial
branch for 15 epochs on data-adv in order to get a strong ad-
versary on the pre-trained encoded representations. Then, due
to time constraints, all networks are fine-tuned on data-adv:
we run 15 epochs of adversarial training (which corresponds
to simple ASR training when α = 0). Due to this, the WER
is comparable to that typically achieved by end-to-end methods
when trained on the train-100 subset of Librispeech rather than
the full train-960 set. Finally, freezing the resulting encoder,
we further fine-tune the speaker-adversarial branch only for 5
epochs to make sure that the reported ACC reflects the perfor-
mance of a well-trained adversary.
The encoder network contains 133.5M parameters. To en-
code a 10s audio file, it perform 1.1e12 arithmetic operations
which can be executed in-parallel on a 40 core CPU in 17.6s
(a) Filterbank (b) α = 0 (c) α = 0.5 (d) α = 2
Figure 2: Visualization of x-vector representations of 20 utterances of 10 speakers computed by t-SNE (perplexity equals to 30). Males
are represented by circles and females by triangles.
and on a single Tesla P100 GPU in 149ms.
3.4. Results and discussion
We train our speaker-adversarial network for α ∈ {0, 0.5, 2.0},
leading to three encoded representations φα(X). Recall that
α = 0 corresponds to the baseline ASR system as it ignores the
speaker-adversarial branch. Table 3 summarizes the results.
The first column presents the ACC and EER obtained with
the input filerbank features, which are consistent with the num-
bers reported in the literature. As expected, speaker identifica-
tion and verification can be addressed to very high accuracy on
those features. Using the encoded representation φ0(X) trained
for ASR only already provides a significant privacy gain: the
ACC is divided by 2 and the EER is multiplied by 4, which
suggests that a reasonable amount of speaker information is re-
moved during ASR training. Nevertheless, φ0(X) still contains
some speaker identity information.
More interestingly, our results clearly show that adversarial
training drastically reduces the performance in speaker identi-
fication but not in verification. On the other hand, and coun-
terintuitive to the speaker-invariance claims by several previ-
ous studies, we observe that the verification performance actu-
ally improves after adversarial training. This exhibits a possible
limitation in the generalization of adversarial training to unseen
speakers and hence establishes the need for further investiga-
tion. The reason for the disparity between classification and
verification performance might be that the speaker-adversarial
branch does not inherently perform verification and hence is not
optimized for that task. It might also be attributed to the rep-
resentation capacity of that branch, to the number of speakers
presented during adversarial training, and/or to the exact range
of α needed for generalizable anonymization. These factors of
variation open several venues for future experiments.
Table 3: ASR and speaker recognition results with different rep-
resentations. WER (%) is reported on test-clean set, ACC (%)
on test-adv set and EER (%) on test-clean-trial.
Filterbank φ0 φ0.5 φ2.0
WER – 10.9 12.5 12.5
ACC 93.1 46.3 6.4 2.5
EER Pooled 5.72 23.07 21.97 19.56
EER Male 3.34 19.38 18.26 16.26
EER Female 7.48 26.46 24.45 22.45
We also notice that the WER stays reasonably low and sta-
bilizes to the value of 12.5% after increasing α from 0.5 to 2. In
particular, for α = 2 the WER is just 1.6% absolute more than
the baseline (α = 0).
We evaluate whether utterances from the same speaker stay
in the same neighborhood or are scattered in the representation
space. We compute t-SNE embeddings on the x-vector repre-
sentations of 20 utterances for 10 speakers (5 male, 5 female),
shown in Figure 2. When using filterbanks, we can observe
well-clustered utterances. The clusters break down when train-
ing the x-vectors on φ0. For the x-vectors trained on φ0.5 and
φ2.0, the clusters start to re-emerge. The silhouette scores for
x-vectors extracted from filterbank, φ0, φ0.5 and φ2.0 represen-
tations are 0.14,−0.17,−0.05 and−0.09 respectively, are con-
sistent with the observed EER values.
4. Conclusions and future work
We proposed to combine CTC and attention losses with a
speaker-adversarial loss within an end-to-end framework with
the goal of learning privacy-preserving representations for ASR.
Such representations could be safely transmitted to cloud-
services for decoding. We investigate the level of speaker
identity anonymization achieved by adversarial training through
closed-set speaker classification and open-set speaker verifica-
tion measures. Adversarial training appears to dramatically re-
duce the closed-set classification accuracy, seemingly indicat-
ing a high-level of anonymization. However, this observation
does not match with the open-set verification results, which cor-
respond to the real scenario of an adversary trying to confirm
the identity of a suspected speaker. Hence we conclude that the
adversarial training does not immediately generalize to produce
anonymous representations in speech. We hypothesize that this
disparity might be attributed to the representation capacity of
the adversarial branch, the size of the training set, the formula-
tion of the adversarial loss, and/or the value of the trade-off pa-
rameter with the ASR loss. As a future work, we plan to modify
the speaker adversarial branch to inherently optimize for verifi-
cation instead of classification and ascertain the impact of these
experimental choices over different datasets, including for lan-
guages not seen in training.
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